Aristotle begins the Nicomachean Ethics by asking what the final good for human beings is. He identifies this final good with happiness, and in the rest of Book I, asks what happiness is. In I 7, Aristotle reaches an “outline” of an answer, claiming that the human good is activity of the soul in accordance with the best and most perfect virtue in a perfect life. But he does not say what the best and most perfect virtue is. Towards the (...) end of the last book of the Ethics, Aristotle seems to answer this question by arguing that the best and most perfect virtue is theoretical wisdom, exercised in theoretical study or contemplation of universal and necessary truths about the universe. He believes that self-sufficiency follows from finality. This article considers Aristotle's conception of happiness, its relation to other goods, happiness as fulfillment of the human function, a monist conception of happiness, complete life, the counting condition, rational life, and moral virtue. (shrink)

First Published in 1995. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This chapter begins by considering the relationship between Christian ethics and moral philosophy. The analysis then turns to the period between the Reformation and the death of St Alphonsus Liguori. It discusses arguments for and against voluntarism; fundamental morality as genuine morality; pagan virtue; what Christian morality adds to morality; moral and positive obligations; and divine love and divine justice.

Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics identify mental health with moral virtue. Are they right? We might be inclined to disagree with him if we believe that mental health is good for the agent, whereas virtues of character are good for other people. These philosophers answer that the mental features of the virtues of character are also features of a person's good. Still, their demands for psychic unity and cohesion might appear to exaggerate reasonable conditions on mental health. In the view (...) of these philosophers, our conception of mental health should make us aware of the aspects of agency that we value. We do not refer to different characteristics when we think of mental health and when we think of moral virtue. The main question is not about whether we choose to confine the expression "mental health" to the minimal condition, but about what makes the minimal condition valuable. It turns out to be difficult to explain why the minimal condition is valuable without also endorsing the moral virtues. (shrink)

Both moral practice and moral theory need a sense of proportion. If it matters whether people have virtues or vices, we are justified in praising virtues and the actions that proceed from them, and justified in criticizing, blaming, and condemning vices and vicious actions. Moral judgment is connected with judgments about responsibility and blameworthiness, because the positive and negative sanctions that belong to morality are serious, and we do not want to apply them to people who do not deserve them. (...) We suppose that acceptance of morality is something that we are entitled to demand (under the appropriate conditions) of other people. These features of moral requirements also encourage us to limit the scope of morality. We do not want to confuse moral judgments with judgments about how we would like people to behave, or what makes us comfortable or uncomfortable, or what we regard as good or bad manners. (shrink)